Complete. “Attic Nights,” Book VI., Chap. xiv.

IT is usually supposed that there are three proper reasons for punishing crimes; the one is “admonition” when a rebuke is administered for the sake of correction and improvement, that he who has committed an accidental offense may become more regular and attentive. The second is that which they who distinguish nicely between terms call “retribution.” This mode of noticing an offense takes place when the dignity and authority of him against whom it is committed is to be defended, lest the passing by the crime should give rise to contempt or a diminution of respect; therefore they suppose this word to signify the vindication of honor. The third mode of punishment is called by the Greeks παραδειγμα (example) and is applied when punishment is necessary for the sake of example, that others may be deterred from similar offenses against the public by the dread of similar punishment. Therefore did our ancestors also denominate the heaviest and most important punishments, examples. When, therefore, there is either great hope that he who has offended will without punishment voluntarily correct himself, or, on the contrary, there is no hope that he can be amended and corrected; or that it is not necessary to fear any loss of that dignity, against which he has offended; or the offense is of that kind, the example of which it is not necessary to impress with particular terror; in this case, and with respect to every such offense, there does not seem to exist the necessity of being eager to inflict punishment. These three modes of vengeance, other philosophers in various places, and our Taurus in the first book of his Commentaries on the “Gorgias” of Plato, has set down. But Plato himself has plainly said that there only exist two causes for punishment. The one, which we have first mentioned, for correction; the other, which we have spoken of in the third place, to deter by example. These are the words of Plato: “It is proper for every one who is punished by him who punishes from a proper motive, that he should become better and receive advantage; or that he should be an example to others, that others, seeing him suffer, may from terror be rendered better.”

  In these lines it is evident that Plato used the word τιμωρια not, as I have before remarked some people have, but in its common and general sense, for all kinds of punishment. But whether, because he passed over as too insignificant and really contemptible, the inflicting punishment to avenge the injured dignity of man; or rather that he omitted it as not being necessary to the question he was discussing, as he was writing of punishments which were to take place not in this life among men, but after death, this I leave to others to determine.