Complete. “Attic Nights,” Book VI., Chap. i.

THEY who think that the world was not produced on account of the Deity and of man, and deny that human affairs are governed by Providence, think that they urge a powerful argument when they assert that if there were a Providence there would be no evils. For nothing, they affirm, can be less consistent with a Providence than that in that world, on account of which the Deity is said to have created man, there should exist so great a number of calamities and evils. Chrysippus, in his fourth book concerning Providence, disputing against these, observes that nothing can be more absurd or foolish than their opinion, who think that there can be good, without the existence of evil. For as good is contrary to evil, and it is necessary that both should exist, opposite to each other, and as it were dependent upon mutual and opposite exertions, so there can be no opposing thing exist without its particular opposite. For how could there be a sense of justice, if there were no injustice? or what indeed is justice but the absence of injustice? In like manner what can we imagine of fortitude, but as opposed to pusillanimity? What of temperance, but from intemperance? What would prudence be, but for its opposite imprudence? Why also should unwise men not require this, that there should exist truth and not falsehood? In like manner exist good and evil, happiness and misery, pain and pleasure. Each, as Plato remarks, is confined to the other by contrary and opposing vortices, so that if you remove one you take away the other. This Chrysippus in the same book examines, investigates, and thinks it an important subject of inquiry, whether the imperfections of men are according to nature; that is, whether the same nature and Providence which formed this universe and the race of men created also the defects and disorders to which men are subject. He thinks that it was not the first design of Providence to make men obnoxious to disorders, for this never could be consistent with the Author of nature and the Creator of all good things. But as, he continues, he produced and formed many and great things, most convenient and useful, there are other kindred inconveniences, adhering to the things which he created. These, he says, were not produced by nature, but by certain necessary consequences, which he denominates κατα παρακολουθησιν. Thus he remarks, when Nature creates the bodies of men, a more subtle cause, and the very usefulness of his work, required that the head should be composed of certain very minute and very delicate bones; but another external inconvenience attached to this usefulness is somewhat of more importance, that the head was less substantially defended and was liable to be broken by blows and slight resistances. In like manner disorders and sickness are obtained whilst health is produced. And thus it is, he remarked, that when, by the purpose of Nature, virtue is created for man, defects are also at the same time produced by a contrary affinity.