[mod. f. prec. + -ISM: in F. conceptualisme.]
1. The scholastic doctrine that universals (genera and species) exist as mental concepts (only): a compromise between Realism, which attributed to them real existence, and Nominalism, which made them mere names. (Usually considered to be a modified or differently stated form of Nominalism.)
1837–8. Sir W. Hamilton, Reid’s Wks., 406, note. Abelard … held a doctrine intermediate between absolute Nominalism and Realism, corresponding to the opinion since called Conceptualism.
1867. Lewes, Hist. Philos., II. 29. This reality of conceptions, which is the point advanced in Conceptualizm.
1875. Jowett, Plato (ed. 2), IV. 132. Neither realism is the truth, nor nominalism is the truth, but conceptualism.
2. The psychological doctrine that the mind is capable of forming an idea (i.e., mental image) corresponding to the abstract and general term: held by, or attributed to, Locke and other English philosophers.
c. 1837. Hamilton, Metaph. (1859), II. xxv. 296. The doctrine of Nominalism has been embraced by Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Principal Campbell, and Mr. Stewart; while Conceptualism has found favour with Locke, Reid, and Brown.
