[Robert Georges]. French general, born at Tulle (Correze) on the 15th of October 1856. He became a student at the École Polytechnique on November 1, 1876 (after having been entered at St. Cyr), and in 1878, as a sub-lieutenant, went through the course at the school of artillery and engineering. He was made a lieutenant in the 19th Regt. of artillery in Octtober 1880 and was promoted captain on December 29, 1887. He became major (chef d’escadrons) in July 1901 and served on the China Expeditionary Corps staff during 1900–01. In 1908, while serving at Ozan, he was made a lieutenant-colonel, and three years later, while serving as chief of staff with the Algiers Division, was promoted colonel. In December 1913 he assumed command of the 5th Regt. of artillery at Besançon and was so employed at the outbreak of the World War in August 1914. At the head of this unit he took part in the operations of the 7th Corps in Alsace (including the battle of Dornach) and was specially mentioned in army orders. On September 6, 1914, on the 7th Corps front he again distinguished himself. The German pressure had compelled a French withdrawal and it seemed as if the 7th Corps would have to cross the Ourcq. Col. Nivelle, however, swiftly reorganized his artillery and massed it at a vulnerable point. By the intensity of his fire he checked the German advance and enabled the French to recover the ground they had lost. Two weeks later, on the Aisne, he again saved a French withdrawal by skilful disposition of the artillery under his command. On October 27, 1914, he was promoted general of brigade. He commanded successively the 44th and 60th Infantry Brigades on the Aisne, and in January 1915 was responsible for the check of the enemy before Soissons. On February 19th following he took over the command of the 61st Division; becoming on December 23rd a substantive general of division and commander of the III. Army Corps. He went to Verdun at the end of March 1916 and a month later took over the II. Army. He planned the operations (executed by Gen. Mangin) which resulted in the reconquest in four and a half hours of the country south of the line Thiaumont–Douaumont–Vaux–Damloup, country which the Germans had taken six months to capture and in the taking of which they had sacrificed some of their best troops. On December 12, 1916, he was made commander-in-chief of the armies of the N. and N.E.
The choice was inspired by a variety of motives, amongst which the most important were the objections, political and to military, raised against more obvious candidates (such as Castelnau, Foch and Pétain), and the feeling that a younger man might solve the problem of break-through which had defeated Joffre. Nivelle was put in command to break traditions and to win the war in the one great effort of which France, after all her losses, was still capable. He was the embodiment of the wave of optimism which swept over the Allied Governments, armies and peoples in the spring of 1917. The story of his failure to realize these expectations need only be summarized here. Accepted by Mr. Lloyd George’s Government as commander-in-chief not only of the French but also of the British front, he asserted his authority from the first moment in such a way as to antagonize Sir Douglas Haig’s headquarters. When this difficulty had been officially smoothed over, he allowed himself to be taken aback by the sudden withdrawal of the German centre in March 1917, which disconcerted nearly all the preparations for the Franco-British offensive. Next, persisting in a sanguine and grandiose offensive scheme to which many of his generals openly took exception, he found himself regarded with suspicion by his Government, and it was in the midst of a series of councils of war, inter-governmental negotiations, and internal incidents that he launched the attack of April 16, 1917, a half victory which was the ruin of his hopes. Some weeks later he was dismissed from the command of the French armies. With the suspension of the offensive (which had already taken place), his command over the British forces had automatically ceased.
Later, Gen. Nivelle served as governor-general of Algeria.
Controversy of peculiar violence has naturally arisen in connection with Nivelle’s command and his offensive. On the general’s side, Commandant de Civrieux’s work is the principal source; on the other Jean de Pierrefeu’s La verité sur l’affaire Nivelle criticizes his actions from the standpoint of the Pétain school. Less definitely critical works, which contain the most important documents and deal with the political aspects of the case, are H. Galli, L’offensive de 1917 and Mermeix, Les Crises du Commandement (pt. ii. Nivelle et Painlevé).
