Complete. Chapter xvii. From the “Philosophical Works” of Leibnitz. Translated by Prof. George Martin Duncan, Yale University.

IN addition to the world or aggregate of finite things, there is some unique Being who governs, not only like the soul in me, or rather like the Ego itself in my body, but in a much higher relation. For one Being dominating the universe not only rules the world, but he creates and fashions it, is superior to the world, and, so to speak, extramundane, and by this very fact is the ultimate reason of things. For the sufficient reason of existence can be found neither in any particular thing, nor in the whole aggregate or series. Suppose a book on the elements of geometry to have been eternal and that others had been successively copied after it, it is evident, that, although we might account for the present book by the book which was its model, we could, nevertheless, never, by assuming any number of books whatever, reach a perfect reason for them; for we may always wonder why such books have existed from all time; that is, why books are and why they are thus written. What is true of books is also true of the different states of the world, for, in spite of certain laws of transformation, a succeeding state is in a certain way only a copy of the preceding, and to whatever anterior state you may go back you will never find there a perfect reason why, forsooth, there is any world at all, and such a world as exists. For even if you imagine the world eternal, nevertheless, since you posit nothing but a succession of states, and as you find a sufficient reason for them in none of them whatsoever, and as any number of them whatever does not aid you in giving a reason for them, it is evident that the reason must be sought elsewhere. For in eternal things it must be understood that even where there is no cause there is a reason which, in perduring things, is necessity itself or essence, but in the series of changing things, if it were supposed that they succeed each other eternally, this reason would be, as will soon be seen, the prevalence of indications where the reasons are not necessitating (by an absolute or metaphysical necessity, the opposite of which would imply contradiction), but inclining. From which it follows that, by supposing the eternity of the world, an ultimate extramundane reason of things, or God, cannot be escaped.

  The reasons of the world, therefore, lie hidden in something extramundane different from the chain of states or series of things the aggregate of which constitutes the world. We must, therefore, pass from physical or hypothetical necessity, which determines the posterior states of the world by the prior, to something which is absolute or metaphysical necessity, the reason for which cannot be given. For the present world is necessary, physically or hypothetically, but not absolutely or metaphysically. It being granted, indeed, that the world is such as it is, it follows that things may hereafter be such as they are. But as the ultimate origin must be in something which is metaphysically necessary, and as the reason of the existing can only be from the existing, there must exist some one being metaphysically necessary, or whose essence is existence; and thus there exists something which differs from the plurality of beings or from the world, which, as we have recognized and shown, is not metaphysically necessary.

  But in order to explain a little more clearly how, from eternal or essential or metaphysical truths, temporary, contingent, or physical truths arise, we ought first to recognize that from the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, there is in possible things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain need of existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence; in a word, that essence tends itself towards existence. Whence it further follows that all possible things, whether expressing essence or possible reality, tend by equal right toward existence, according to their quantity of essence or reality, or according to the degree of perfection which they contain, for perfection is nothing else than quantity of essence.

  Hence it is most clearly understood that among the infinite combinations of possibles and possible series, that one exists by which the most of essence or of possibility is brought into existence. And, indeed, there is always in things a principle of determination which is to be taken from the greatest and the smallest, or in such a way that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to speak, expenditure. And here the time, place, or, as many say, the receptivity or capacity of the world may be considered as the expenditure or the ground which can be most easily built upon, whereas the varieties of forms correspond to the commodiousness of the edifice and the multiplicity and elegance of its chambers. And it is with it in this respect as with certain games where all the spaces on a table are to be filled according to determined laws. Now, unless a certain skill be employed, you will be finally excluded by unfavorable spaces and forced to leave many more places empty than you can or wish. But there is a certain very easy way of filling the most possible space. Just as, therefore, if it is resolved to make a triangle, there being no other determining reason, it commonly happens that an equilateral results; and if it is resolved to go from one point to another without any further determination as to the way, the easiest and shortest path will be chosen; so it being once posited that being is better than not being, or that there is a reason why something should be rather than nothing, or that we must pass from the possibility to the act, it follows that even in the absence of every other determination the quantity of existence is as great as possible, regard being had to the capacity of the time and of the place (or to the possible order of existence), exactly as the squares are disposed in a given area in such a way that it shall contain the greatest number of them possible. From this it is now marvelously understood how, in the very origin of things, a sort of divine mathematics or of metaphysical mechanism was employed, and how the determination of the greatest quantity of existence takes place. It is thus that from all angles the determined angle in geometry is the right angle, and that liquids placed in heterogeneous positions take that form which has the most capacity, or the spherical; but especially it is thus that in ordinary mechanics itself, when several heavy bodies strive together, the motion which results constitutes, on the whole, the greatest descent. For just as all the possibles tend by equal right to exist by reason of reality, so all weights tend by an equal right to descend by reason of their gravity; and as here a movement is produced which contains the greatest possible descent of heavy bodies, so there a world is produced in which is found realized the greatest number of possibles.

  And thus we now have physical necessity from metaphysical; for, although the world be not metaphysically necessary, in the sense that its contrary implies a contradiction or a logical absurdity, it is nevertheless physically necessary, or determined in such a way that its contrary implies imperfection or moral absurdity. And as possibility is the principle of essence, so perfection or the degree of essence (through which the greatest possible number is at the same time possible) is the principle of existence. Whence at the same time it is evident that the author of the world is free, although he makes all things determinately, for he acts according to a principle of wisdom or of perfection. Indeed, indifference arises from ignorance, and the wiser one is the more determined one is to the highest degree of perfection.

  But, you will say, however ingenious this comparison of a certain determining metaphysical mechanism with the physical mechanism of heavy bodies may appear, nevertheless it fails in this, that heavy bodies truly exist, whereas possibilities and essences prior to existence or outside of it are only fancies or fictions in which the reason of existence cannot be sought. I answer, that neither these essences nor these so-called eternal truths are fictions, but that they exist in a certain region of ideas, if I may thus speak, that is, in God himself, the source of all essences and of the existence of all else. And the existence of the actual series of things shows sufficiently of itself that my assertion is not gratuitous. For since the reason is not found in this series, as we have shown above, but must be sought in metaphysical necessities or eternal truths, and since that which exists can only come from that which existed, as we have remarked above, eternal truths must have their existence in a certain subject absolutely and metaphysically necessary, that is, in God, through whom those things which otherwise would be imaginary, are, to speak barbarously but significantly, realized.

  And in truth we discover that everything is done in the world according to the laws, not only geometrical, but also metaphysical, of eternal truths; that is, not only according to material necessities, but also according to formal necessities; and this is true, not only generally in that which concerns the reason, which we have just explained, of a world existing rather than nonexisting, and existing thus rather than otherwise (a reason which can only be found in the tendency of the possible to existence), but if we descend to the special we see the metaphysical laws of cause, of power, of action holding good in admirable manner in all nature, and prevailing over the purely geometrical laws themselves of matter, as I found in accounting for the laws of motion: a thing which struck me with such astonishment that, as I have explained more at length elsewhere, I was forced to abandon the law of the geometrical composition of forces which I had defended in my youth when I was more materialistic.

  Thus, therefore, we have the ultimate reason of the reality, as well of essences as of existences, in a Being who is necessarily much superior and anterior to the world itself, since it is from him that not only the existences which this world contains, but also the possibles themselves derive their reality. And this reason of things can be sought only in a single source, because of the connection which they all have with one another. But it is evident that it is from this source that existing things continually emanate, that they are and have been its products, for it does not appear why one state of the world rather than another, the state of to-day rather than that of to-morrow, should come from the world itself. We see also, with the same clearness, how God acts, not only physically but freely; how the efficient and final cause of things is in him, and how he manifests not only his greatness and his power in the construction of the machine of the world, but also his goodness and his wisdom in the creation. And in order that no one should think that we confound here moral perfection or goodness with metaphysical perfection or greatness, or that the former is denied while the latter is granted, it must be known that it follows from what has been said that the world is most perfect, not physically, or, if you prefer, metaphysically, because that series of things is produced in which there is the most reality in action, but also that it is most perfect morally, because really moral perfection is physical perfection for souls themselves. Thus the world is not only the most admirable machine, but, in so far as it is composed of souls, it is also the best republic, through which as much happiness or joy is brought to souls as is possible, in which their physical perfection consists.

  But you will say, we experience the contrary in this world, for often good people are very unhappy, and not only innocent brutes, but also innocent men, are afflicted and even put to death with torture; finally, the world, if you regard especially the government of the human race, resembles a sort of confused chaos rather than the well-ordered work of a supreme wisdom. This may appear so at the first glance, I confess, but if you examine the thing more closely, it evidently appears from the things which have been alleged, that the contrary should be affirmed; that is, that all things and consequently souls attain to the highest degree of perfection possible. And in truth it is not proper to judge before having examined, as the jurisconsults say, the whole law. We know only a very small part of the eternity which extends into immensity; for the memory of the few thousands of years which history transmits to us are, indeed, a very little thing. And yet from an experience so short we dare to judge of the immense and of the eternal, like men who, born and brought up in a prison, or, if you prefer, in the subterranean salt mines of the Sarmatiæ, think that there is no other light in the world than the lamp whose feeble gleam hardly suffices to direct their steps. Let us look at a very beautiful picture, and let us cover it in such a way as to see only a very small part of it. What else will appear in it, however closely we may examine it and however near we may approach to it, except a certain confused mass of colors, without choice and without art? And yet when we remove the covering and regard it from the proper point of view, we will see that what appeared thrown on the canvas at haphazard has been executed with the greatest art by the author of the work. What the eyes discover in the picture, the ears discover in music. The most illustrious composers often introduce discords into their harmonies in order to excite and pique, so to speak, the listener, who, anxious as to the outcome, is all the more pleased when soon all things are restored to order. Just as we rejoice to have passed through slight dangers and experienced small ills, whether because of a feeling of egotism, or because we find pleasure in the frightful images which tight-rope dances or leapings between swords (sauts perilleux) present, so we partly lose laughing children, pretending to throw them far away from us, like the ape which, having taken Christian, king of the Danes, while still an infant wrapped in swaddling clothes, carried him to the top of the roof, and, when everybody was frightened, brought him back laughing, safe and sound to his cradle. According to the same principle, it is insipid always to eat sweetmeats; we must mingle with them sharp, acid, and even bitter things, which excite the taste. He who has not tasted bitter things has not merited sweet things, and even will not appreciate them. It is the law even of joy that pleasure be not uniform, for it engenders disgust, renders us stupid and not joyous.

  As to what we said, that a part may be disturbed without prejudice to the general harmony, it must not be understood as meaning that no account is made of the parts, or that it suffices that the entire world be perfect in measure, although it might happen that the human race should be unhappy, and that there should be in the universe no regard for justice, no heed taken of our lot, as some think who do not judge rightly enough of the whole of things. For it must be known that as in a well-constituted republic as much care as possible is taken of the good of the individual, so the universe cannot be perfect if individual interests are not protected as much as the universal harmony will permit. And here a better law could not be established than the very law of justice which wills that each one participate in the perfection of the universe and in a happiness of his own proportioned to his own virtue and to the good-will he entertains toward the common good, by which that which we call the charity and love of God is fulfilled, in which alone, according to the judgment of the wisest theologians, the force and power of the Christian religion itself consists. And it ought not appear astonishing that so large a part should be given to souls in the universe since they reflect the most faithful image of the supreme Author, and hold to him not only the relation of machine to artificer, but also that of citizen to prince; and they are to continue as long as the universe itself; and in a manner they express and concentrate the whole in themselves so that it can be said that souls are whole parts.

  As regards especially the afflictions of good people, we must hold for certain that there results for them a greater good, and this is not only theologically, but physically true. So grain cast into the ground suffers before producing its fruit. And we may affirm, generally, that afflictions, temporarily evil, are in effect good, since they are short cuts to greater perfections. So in physics, liquors which ferment slowly take more time also to improve; whereas, those the agitation of which is greater, reject certain parts with more force and are more promptly improved.

  And we might say of this that it is retreating in order the better to leap forward (qu’on recede, pour mieux sauter).

  We should, therefore, regard these considerations not merely as agreeable and consoling, but also as most true. And, in general, I feel that there is nothing truer than happiness, and nothing happier nor sweeter than truth.