From “Philosophy of History.”

THE TRUE sphere of the history of the world is spiritual. The world comprises in itself both the physical and the psychical nature; physical nature plays a large part in the history of the world. But spirit, with the course of its development, is the substance of it. Nature is not here to be considered, so far as it is in itself, as it were, a system of reason, exhibited in a special and peculiar element, but only as it stands related to spirit. Spirit, however, in the theatre of the world’s history, exists in its most concrete form, comes to its most real manifestations. In order to understand its connections with history, we must make some preliminary and abstract statements respecting the nature of spirit.

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  The nature of spirit may be easily understood by comparison with that which is the entire opposite of it,—that is, matter. The substance of matter is weight, which is only this, that it is heavy; the substance, the essence of spirit, on the contrary, is freedom. Every one finds it immediately credible that spirit, among other attributes, also possesses freedom; but philosophy teaches us that all the attributes of spirit exist only through freedom, that they all are only the means of which freedom makes use, that this alone is what they all seek for and produce. The speculative philosophy recognizes this fact, that freedom is the only truth of spirit. Matter shows that it is weight, by its tendency to one centre of gravity; it is essentially made up of parts, which parts exist separate from, and external to, each other; and it is ever seeking their unity, and thus seeks to abolish itself,—seeks the opposite of what it really is. If it attained this unity, it were no longer matter, it were destroyed; it strives to realize an idea, for in unity it is merely ideal. Spirit, on the other hand, is just this, that it has its centre in itself; its unity is not outside of itself, but it has found it; it is in itself and with itself. Matter has its substance out of itself; spirit consists in being with itself. This is freedom; for when I am dependent, I refer myself to something else which is not myself; I cannot be without something external; but I am free when I am with myself. This is self-consciousness, the consciousness of oneself. Two things are here to be distinguished: first, that I know or am conscious; second, what I know or am conscious of. In self-consciousness, the two come together, for spirit knows itself; it judges of its own nature.

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  In this sense, we may say that the history of the world is the exhibition of the process by which spirit comes to the consciousness of that which it really is,—of the significancy of its own nature. And as the seed contains in itself the whole nature of the tree, even to the taste and form of the fruit, so do the first traces of spirit virtually contain the whole of history.

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  The Oriental world did not know that spirit, man as such, is of himself free. Since they knew it not, they were not free; they only knew that one is free: but just on this account their freedom was only arbitrariness, wildness, obtuse passion; or, if not so, yet a mildness and tameness of the passions, which is nothing but an accident or caprice of nature. This one is, therefore, only a despot, not a free man. Among the Greeks, the consciousness of freedom first arose, and therefore they were free; but they, as the Romans also, only knew that some are free, not that man, as such, is free. Even Plato and Aristotle did not know this. Hence, the Greeks not only held slaves, and had their life and the continuance of their fair freedom bound thereby, but their freedom itself was partly only an accidental and perishable flower, and partly a hard servitude of the human and humane. The German nations, under the influence of Christianity, first came to the consciousness that man, as man, is free,—that freedom of soul constitutes his own proper nature. This consciousness came first into existence in religion,—in the deepest religion of the spirit. But to fashion the world after this principle was a further problem; the solution and application of which demanded a severe and long labor. With the reception of the Christian religion, for example, slavery did not at once come to an end, still less did freedom at once become predominant in the States; their governments and constitutions were not immediately organized in a rational manner, or even based upon the principle of freedom. This application of the principle to the world at large, this thorough penetration and reformation of the condition of the world by means of it, is the long process which the history of the nations brings before our eyes. I have already called attention to the difference between a principle, as such, and its application,—that is, the introduction of it into the actual operations of spirit and life, and carrying it through all of them; this is a fundamental position in our science, and it is essential that we hold it fast in our thoughts. Here we have brought it out distinctly, in respect to the Christian principle of self-consciousness of freedom; but it is no less essential in respect to the principle of freedom in general. The history of the world is the progress in the consciousness of freedom,—a progress which we shall have to recognize in its necessity.

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    What we have now said, in general terms, upon the difference in the knowledge of freedom which we find in different ages of the world, gives us, also, the true division of the history of the world, and the mode in which we shall proceed to its discussion. The scheme is this: the Oriental world only knew that one is free; the Greek and Roman world knew that some are free; but we know that all men, in their true nature, are free,—that man, as man, is free.

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