From “The Governour.”

ARISTOTLE defineth this virtue to be a mediocrity in the pleasures of the body, specially in taste and touching. Therefore he that is temperate fleeth pleasures voluptuous, and with the absence of them is not discontented, and from the presence of them he willingly abstaineth. But in mine opinion, Plotinus, the wonderful philosopher, maketh an excellent definition of temperance, saying that the property or office thereof is to covet nothing which may be repented, also not to exceed the bounds of mediocrity, and to keep desire under the yoke of reason. He that practiceth this virtue is called a temperate man, and he that doeth contrary thereto is named intemperate. Between whom and a person incontinent Aristotle maketh this diversity; that he is intemperate which by his own election is led, supposing that the pleasure that is present, or, as I might say, in use should always be followed. But the person incontinent supposeth not so, and yet he, notwithstanding, doth follow it. The same author also maketh a diversity between him that is temperate and him that is continent; saying that the continent man is such, one that nothing will do for bodily pleasure which shall stand against reason. The same is he which is temperate, saving that the other hath corrupt desires, which this man lacketh. Also the temperate man delighteth in nothing contrary to reason. But he that is continent delighteth, yet he will not be led against reason. Finally, to declare it in a few words, we may well call him a temperate man that desireth the thing which he ought to desire, and as he ought to desire, and when he ought to desire. Notwithstanding there be divers other virtues which do seem to be as it were companions with temperance. Of whom, for the eschewing of tediousness, I will speak now only of two, moderation and soberness, which no man, I suppose, doubteth to be of such efficacy that without them no man may attain unto wisdom, and by them wisdom is soonest espied.