From Book I. Sir Roger L’Estrange’s translation.

THE PRINCIPAL virtue is, as I have said, that which the Greeks call σοψία, and we wisdom. But their ψρόνησις (or prudence) is quite another thing, being the skill of judging what we are to do and what not, or of distinguishing betwixt good and evil; whereas wisdom (which we call the principal) is the knowledge of things divine and human, wherein is comprehended a certain correspondence betwixt the gods and men, and a society among themselves. Now if this be the most eminent virtue, as certainly it is, so must that likewise be the most eminent duty which refers to community. For the speculation and perception of things is but lame and imperfect if it be not followed with action, which action is best seen in providing for the common benefits of mankind, and must therefore be reduced to the subject of human society in preference to the naked understanding of things. And this does every good man find to be true upon his own practice and observation. For where’s the man that is so transported with a thirst of knowledge or a desire of piercing into the nature of things, that if he should be called upon the sudden to the relief of his country, his father, or his friend that were in danger: where is the man, I say, that in the heat and rapture of his most divine contemplations would not quit all to attend this duty, even supposing him to be in his thoughts already numbering the stars and taking measure of the universe? This gives us to understand that the offices of justice conducing to the common utility of mankind (than which nothing ought to be dearer to us) are of so much greater importance than these of study and science; and never was any man so taken up in his life and application with the search of knowledge as not yet to have an eye to his duty to the public, and to consult the well-being of sociable nature, as we see in the instance of Lysis the Pythagorean to the Theban Epaminondas; and in that of Plato to Dion of Syracuse; and divers others that trained up their disciples to the love, knowledge, and exercise of civil duties. And for the service (if any at all) which I myself have rendered to the republic, I must ascribe it to my masters and to my books that instructed and fitted me for my function. For great men do not only teach the lovers of learning during their lives, but in their very graves too, transmitting their precepts down to after times for the use of posterity. Now to show how much their leisures contributed to our business, these eminent men have not slipt so much as any one point appertaining to the laws, manners, and discipline of the commonwealth, but have still, with all their faculties, applied the fruits of their labors and studies to the well-being of the public. So that a copious eloquence, joined with prudence, is much more profitable than the most refined subtilty of thought, without speaking. For meditation does only circulate within itself; whereas eloquence works upon others, and insinuates itself into the affections of all that hear it. We must not imagine that bees gather into swarms upon a design to make their cells, but it is in their nature to congregate, and then they work their combs. And so it is with men, who are much more sociable by nature; when they are gotten together they consult their common business. Now for that virtue (of justice) which provides for the defense and conservation of men in society, if it be not accompanied with the understanding of things it is but solitary and fruitless. And what is courage, without the softness of human courtesy and candor, but a savage and outrageous brutality? From hence we may infer the excellency of a practical justice in the ordering of mankind above the force and effect of a speculative notion. There are some people that fancy all leagues and associations amongst men to arise from the need that one man has for another toward the supplying of our natural and common necessities; because, say they, if Providence had delivered us from this care of looking after food and clothing by appointing some extraordinary way for the furnishing of it, no man of either brains or virtue would ever trouble his head about business, but wholly deliver himself up to the attaining of wisdom. But this is a mistake, for even in that condition a man would fly solitude, and wish for a companion in his very studies; he would be willing to teach and to learn, to hear and to speak. So that beyond question the duties that defend and support men in society are more to be esteemed than those that barely relate to learning and knowledge.

  It may be another question whether this community which is so consonant to nature be in all cases to be preferred to modesty and moderation. Now I think not. For there are some things, partly so foul and in part so flagitious, that a wise man (even if it were to save his country) would not be guilty of them. Posidonius has made a large collection of such cases, but so filthy, so obscene, that a man cannot honestly repeat them. Now why should any man do that for the saving of his country which his country itself would rather perish than any member of it should do? But, however, this is the best on’t; that it can never be for the interest of the public to have a wise man do any such thing. Let it be therefore concluded that of all duties we are to prefer those that tend toward the maintaining of society; for a considerate action presumes an antecedent cognition and wisdom. So that it is more to do considerately than to think wisely. But let this suffice, for the matter is made so plain that there will be no difficulty to resolve upon two duties in question which to choose. But then in the community itself there are several degrees of duties in subordination one to another. The first is what we owe to the immortal gods, the second to our country, the third to our parents; and so in order, successively, to others.